North Africa's Arab Spring by George Joffé

Author:George Joffé [Joffé, George]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780415629836
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2014-08-22T00:00:00+00:00

In fact, when the Libyan government called for a ceasefire in the opening stages of the imposition of the UN no fly zone in March 2011, it did so in the name of the Popular Social Leadership.39

Qadhafi’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy amongst the tribes was combined with a formal policy of collective punishment. In compulsory ‘certificates of allegiance’ (wathiqat ‘ahd wa mubya’a) and ‘certificates of honour’ (wathiqat ash-sharaf), tribes themselves were made responsible for the loyalties of their members. Qadhafi attempted to mobilise this system after uncovering the Bani Ulid coup plot in 1993. A plan to kill the Libyan leader was linked to elements from within the Qadhadhfa and Warfalla, though the ringleaders were drawn mainly from the latter tribe. Qadhafi insisted that, in accordance with the wathiqat, Warfalli leaders should condemn and execute ten of the military officers responsible. The tribal elders refused, leaving the grim task to the regime, which afterwards sought to punish the clans and sub-clans from which the coup attempt came.40 This episode demonstrated the lengths which the regime would go to in order to exploit tribal identities. Yet it also revealed that, no matter how elaborate the patronage networks and informal governance systems in Libya, the regime was ultimately reliant upon the bare and brutal logic of force.

The coup plot of 1993 might also be linked to the defection to the rebels of parts of the Warfalla tribe, but not others. In the opening stages of the 2011 uprising Ban Ulid itself was taken over by protesters, with slogans such as ‘Kill Qadhafi’ spray painted on buildings. A statement was released by ‘the Warfalla tribal elders’ in which they denounced and renounced Colonel Qadhafi, calling on Libyans to ‘fully rebel against the enemy of God and his regime who murdered their own people in cold blood’.41 However, some Warfallis were clearly fighting on in Qadhafi’s militias and it seemed that there had been no mass defection. A month later, the regime was able to stage a press visit to a recaptured Bani Ulid, though it seemed likely to some correspondents that the men coming forward to express their unwavering support for the regime ‘had been coerced or bribed’42. After the collapse of the regime in Tripoli, Ban Ulid came to the fore again as a Qadhafi stronghold – members of his family were believed to have sought refuge in the town and, knocking back the NTC’s offer of negotiations, his supporters there ‘were raring to fight for their deposed leader’.43

Of course, it is important not to over-emphasise tribalism as an explanatory variable. Tribal affiliations and identifications have been eroded significantly by mass urbanisation (two cities alone, Tripoli and Benghazi, are home to over a third of the Libyan population). Moreover, the universalism of the demands which bound the protesters together – freedom from tyranny and the opportunity to live with dignity – was complemented by the nationalistic impulse of easterners not to abandon their co-nationals in the west: ‘Our capital is Tripoli and will forever be Tripoli… We would like to emphasise this over and over again’.

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